Ý Nghĩa Các Ngày 19 Tháng 8 Và 2 Tháng 9 Đối Với Người Việt Hiện Nay

1. “Đánh Pháp để giành độc lập”

1. “Đánh Mỹ để thống nhất đất nước”

The Meanings of the August 19th and September 2nd Celebrations

to the Vietnamese People Today

Every year when August comes, the Vietnamese Communist regime jubilantly celebrates August 19th — the day they seized power from the government of Trần Trọng Kim in 1945 — and September 2nd, when Hồ Chí Minh read the “Declaration of Independence” at Ba Đình Square in Hà Nội.

The following lines aim to provide some basic knowledge for younger Vietnamese, those who have not had the opportunity to know much about these two historical events.

Meanwhile, the Vietnamese Communists have always boasted that they successfully led the nation in two great wars:

1. The war against France to gain independence, and
2. The war against the United States to unify the country.

Therefore, they claim the right — and the monopoly — to rule the nation. They equate their regime with the Vietnamese Fatherland. Inside the country, anyone who speaks out to criticize the regime is accused of treason.

This year, 2025, marks the 80th year since the Vietnamese Communists seized power in 1945 and dragged the nation into two devastating wars, which ended in 1975 but whose consequences and deep divisions remain severe to this day. It is therefore appropriate for us to calmly re-examine the true nature of the Vietnamese communist revolution and the origins of those wars, and then objectively assess just how great the achievements of the Vietnamese Communist Party really were.

I. “Fighting the French to Gain Independence”

After World War II ended in 1945, the Western powers became aware that in the new global context, continuing to hold Asian nations as colonies was no longer acceptable. The colonial system had reached its end. For that reason:

• The United States granted independence to the Philippines. The Philippines declared independence on July 4, 1945.
• Britain granted independence to India. India became independent in 1947.
• Britain granted independence to Burma (now Myanmar). Burma became independent in January 1948.
• Britain granted independence to Malaya (now Malaysia). Since Malaya consisted of several states and territories, its politics were complex. Malaya was granted self-rule in 1948 and full independence in 1957.
• The Netherlands granted independence to Indonesia. At first, the Dutch colonialists greedily refused, forcing the Indonesians to wage armed struggle for four years. Under global pressure, especially from the United States, Indonesia finally achieved full independence in December 1949.
• The only Asian nation that had to fight bitterly until 1954 and then suffered partition was Vietnam.

Although the U.S. sympathized with Vietnam’s independence, it did not pressure France the way it pressured the Dutch in Indonesia. There were several reasons, but the main one was: the Hồ Chí Minh’s regime was communist, and under various pseudonyms Hồ had already been identified as an agent of the international Communist movement, trained by the Comintern in Moscow.

According to Prof. Tường Vũ in his book Vietnam’s Communist Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), after carefully examining the Văn Kiện Đảng Toàn Tập (Collected Party Documents) of the Hanoi regime, the professor — a political scientist and director of the Center for Asian Studies at the University of Oregon — discovered that as early as 1946, three years before Mao Zedong’s victory in China, secret party documents of the Viet Minh regime had always praised the “socialist forces” led by the Soviet Union, and  criticized “American imperialism” ¹.

Although Hồ collaborated with some U.S. OSS officers in 1945, although he used a signed photo of General Claire L. Chennault to claim he had “American backing,” and he quoted the U.S. Declaration of Independence in his own declaration, he never denied being a Communist.

In 1945–1946, alongside writing letters to U.S. President Harry Truman, Hồ also wrote to Soviet leader Stalin asking for support — and received no reply in either case. As early as 1941–1942, the Việt Nam Độc Lập newspaper, founded by Hồ, praised the Soviet Union as a paradise and wrote: “Only when Russia wins completely will the world see glorious days.” ²

In late 1945, although Hồ publicly announced the “voluntary dissolution” of the Vietnamese Communist Party to deceive public opinion, Sự Thật (Truth), the biweekly journal of the “Association for Marxist Studies,” run by Trường Chinh, still declared in its debut issue of December 5, 1945: “The only path that can lead humanity to freedom, peace, and happiness is the thorough implementation of Marxism.” ³

Looking back decades later, many historians have concluded that the so-called “August Revolution” of the Việt Minh in 1945 was in fact nothing more than a power grab, and the Communists themselves used the verb “cướp” (to seize, to rob). Even more sadly, that “cướp” action was not necessary, because after Japan surrendered to the Allies on August 15, 1945, a political power vacuum existed in Vietnam:

• The French: sidelined by the Japanese coup of March 9, 1945; key officials were imprisoned.
• The Japanese: having surrendered, especially after the atomic bombings, they were preparing to hand over weapons and be repatriated.
• The Trần Trọng Kim government: composed of teachers and intellectuals with no political ambition, formed to administer the country after the French collapse. They focused only on social issues, famine relief, health, and education. They were ready to resign when others could replace them, and eventually did resign.
• Emperor Bảo Đại: ready to abdicate, declaring, “I would rather be a citizen of an independent country than a king of a subjugated one.”

In the book Bảo Đại, Trần Trọng Kim và Đế quốc Việt Nam (California: Truyền Thống Việt, 2017), Prof. Phạm Cao Dương let us know that in the meeting between Emperor Bảo Đại and the Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet in Huế on August 17, 1945, alongside the opinion of handing full power to the Việt Minh, there was also the view of Lawyer Vũ Văn Hiền, Minister of Finance, who argued: Vietnam needed a legitimate government to guarantee order, and so that when the Allies arrived there would already be a legally constituted government, with status and authority to deal with them. Otherwise, they might use the pretext that Vietnam was in chaos and without a legitimate government as a reason of helping the French colonialists return. To achieve that, the power to form a government should be granted to the Việt Minh, but the monarchical institution should be retained (transformed into a constitutional monarchy) ⁴.

This opinion was supported by legally knowledgeable ministers such as Trịnh Đình Thảo, Trần Văn Chương, and Phan Anh. A royal decree was immediately drafted: Decree No. 105, dated August 17, 1945. In it, Emperor Bảo Đại expressed the readiness to hand power to the Việt Minh as a national liberation organization, and invited their leaders to Huế to form a cabinet ⁵.

As early as the beginning of August 1945, Prime Minister Trần Trọng Kim, in his capacity as head of government, had already intended to invite Việt Minh representatives to cooperate. While traveling from Huế to Hanoi, he asked Khâm sai (Royal commissioner) Phan Kế Toại to discreetly sound out the Việt Minh. The one who came to meet him was still very young, but the elderly teacher, author of Việt Nam Sử Lược (A Brief History of Vietnam), said:

• “We are working only for the country, not seeking fame or profit. I am sure your party also acts for the nation. If so, then though we travel different paths, we share the same goal. Let us see if we can cooperate—some inside, some outside—to save the country, can’t we?”

In subsequent lines, Trần Trọng Kim summarized the dialogue between him and the Việt Minh representative:

• The representative said: “Our actions are based on our own ideology and program to bring the country to complete independence. We can achieve it ourselves.”
• Trần Trọng Kim: “The pursuit of independence is also our goal, but since the straight path has many obstacles, we must take a winding route, slowly, perhaps more securely.”
• The representative: “We have only one straight path to full independence, not two.”
• Trần Trọng Kim: “According to your way, I fear it will greatly harm the people, and it is uncertain whether you will succeed.”
• The representative: “We are certain to succeed. If harm comes, it does not matter—only after harm comes benefit. Even if nine out of ten people die, we will build a new society from those who remain, which is better than keeping the other nine parts.” (emphasis by the chronicler)

Then the representative recited from memory a monologue outlining Việt Minh activities. Seeing such an attitude, I knew reason could not prevail. I said:

• “If you are sure of securing independence, why don’t you enter the government to work, instead of causing upheavals to the people’s sufferings?”
• The representative: “We will seize power to show the Allies that we are strong, not accept anyone handing it to us.”
• “Are you sure the Allies will believe in your strength?”
• “Absolutely sure. One hundred percent.”
• “The future is long; you take responsibility before the nation and history” ⁶.

According to Prof. Phạm Cao Dương, the Việt Minh envoy who met Trần Trọng Kim on that day was Lê Trọng Nghĩa. Records show he was born in 1922 (only 23 years old in 1945). After the Việt Minh’s success, he was elected to the National Assembly, then became Director of Military Intelligence, later rising to Colonel, Chief of Staff, and aide to General Võ Nguyên Giáp. In 1968 he was arrested, accused of ties to the “Nhóm Xét lại chống Đảng”  (“Revisionist Anti-Party” group), imprisoned and sent to “reeducation labor” until 1976. He was expelled from the Communist Party and stripped of rank and privileges. After 47 years of silence, before his death in 2015, he left a will requesting exoneration. His close friend Trần Đĩnh, in the book Đèn Cù, recorded Nghĩa’s grief over his children’s suffering: in their dossiers they were branded “children of an anti-Party traitor.” Trần Đĩnh recalled Nghĩa’s words in bewilderment: “So, it’s all gone?” ⁷

Lê Trọng Nghĩa was also received by Commissioner Phan Kế Toại in the morning of August 16, 1945. This time, Toại officially invited the Việt Minh Front to cooperate with the Trần Trọng Kim government, “gladly awaiting the Front to appoint participants to the cabinet.” But Nguyễn Khang (Chairman of the Hanoi Revolutionary Military Committee), coming with Nghĩa, bluntly replied: “It is best that you resign and hand power over to the Việt Minh” ⁸.

The historian David G. Marr, in Vietnam 1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), based on Hanoi sources, notes that before the August 16 meeting with Lê Trọng Nghĩa, Commissioner Phan Kế Toại had already received a Việt Minh delegation led by Nguyễn Khang on August 13. Through Khang, Toại invited Việt Minh to hold positions in government, but Khang firmly refused ⁹.

The next contact occurred at 8 a.m. on August 18, 1945, at a villa at 101 Gambetta Street (now Trần Hưng Đạo Street, Hanoi). The government representative was Professor Hoàng Xuân Hãn, Minister of Education and Fine Arts, a highly respected scholar. He introduced himself as “the highest-ranking representative of the Prime Minister in Hanoi,” and announced: “We are certain that Allied troops have begun moving, dividing to occupy our country north and south of the 16th parallel. The nation faces the threat of re-occupation and partition once again.”

Professor Hãn suggested: “Let us continue negotiating. You, the Việt Minh, may control all rural areas, but allow the government to administer some major cities—simply for legitimacy in dealing with the Allies now, otherwise the danger is grave” ¹⁰.

Neither Trần Trọng Kim nor Hoàng Xuân Hãn were men of political ambition. Their proposals—that the Việt Minh maintain the monarchy while forming the government, or that they leave the cabinet a few major cities for holding dialogue with the Allies—were solely for the sake of national interest. The Việt Minh’s act of “seizing power” meant that the government they formed afterwards lacked a solid legal basis.

By mid-September 1945, when the British General Douglas Gracey arrived in Saigon to disarm Japanese troops south of the 16th parallel, facing chaotic protests and bloody clashes around Saigon but finding no recognized legal Vietnamese authority to deal with, he acted in ways favorable to the French.

According to Prof. Phạm Cao Dương, Lê Trọng Nghĩa went once more to the Khâm Sai Palace on the afternoon of August 18 to meet with Dr. Nguyễn Xuân Chữ, who was representing the government in place of Khâm Sai Phan Kế Toại (after the latter had resigned). But the purpose was not discussion, only to probe the situation.

In these meetings—except for the last—Trần Trọng Kim, Phan Kế Toại, and Prof. Hoàng Xuân Hãn all sincerely invited the Việt Minh to join the government, to “work together for the interests of the nation.” But all such offers were refused. The reason was that the Việt Minh, whose core was the Communist Party, had already determined to “seize power” (cướp chính quyền) in order to lead the country alone and carry out a revolution according to their own line—regardless of the harms and dangers this might bring to the nation. Lê Trọng Nghĩa himself declared:

“Even if nine out of ten people die, we will build a new society from those who remain, which is better than keeping the other nine parts.”

This was also the reason that in 1945–1946, before and after seizing power, the Việt Minh systematically sought to eliminate all prominent intellectuals and non-Communist political activists. We can list: Phạm Quỳnh, Khái Hưng, Tạ Thu Thâu, Phan Văn Hùm, Bùi Quang Chiêu, Hồ Văn Ngà, Huỳnh Văn Phương, Trần Văn Thạch, lawyer Dương Văn Giáo, Dr. Hồ Vĩnh Ký and his wife Dr. Nguyễn Ngọc Sương, Trương Tử Anh, Lý Đông A, Nhượng Tống… Even influential religious leaders such as Đức Thầy Huỳnh Phú Sổ of Hòa Hảo Buddhism were assassinated.

On August 17, 1945 in Hanoi, at 3 p.m., during a rally of the Civil Servants’ Association in front of the Opera House—organized to support the government after Japan’s surrender—Việt Minh cadres stormed the loudspeakers, shouted “Long live Việt Minh!” and raised the red flag with the yellow star. Historian Đoàn Thêm recorded:

“Then the demonstration was ordered to march, parading through many major streets… At Cửa Nam six-way intersection, a few young men in short shirts and black trousers, clearly not civil servants, ran while waving the red flag with yellow star. Another raised an object rarely seen at that time—a revolver—and fired several shots as if to intimidate, ‘Comrades, let us shout together: Long live the Liberation Front!’ Some civil servants, perhaps too frightened, reluctantly and mechanically shouted ‘Long live’!”¹¹

On August 19, early in the morning, the Việt Minh organized a mass rally in front of the Opera House with the aim of “seizing power.” According to the memoirs of the researcher Hoàng Tường in the book Việt Nam Đấu Tranh:

“At first there were only about 500 people, but as the march passed through each street section, onlookers joined in. The demonstration grew to about 2,000 people, mostly youth. At the head was a large flag (red background with yellow star), followed by banners big and small… Alongside the marchers was a group riding bicycles with flags attached to their handlebars, shouting, ‘Support Việt Minh to seize power’.” ¹²

Dr. Nguyễn Tường Bách recalled:

“Some people carried small red paper flags, some shouted slogans: ‘Support independence, Down with French colonialism.’ From time to time, a few would peel off into nearby houses, urging people to come out and join the rally. Thus the number of people in the street grew larger and larger, men and women, old and young. For even if one was not eager to march, it was hard to refuse participation in an activity to support independence.”¹³

Hoàng Tường continued:

“The march first stopped at the Khâm Sai Palace. As the chants ‘Support Việt Minh to seize power’ thundered, a group of about 10 people broke off and entered the palace, before the bewildered face of a single Bảo An guard at his post. Leading were two men with revolvers, followed by two others carrying a large red flag with yellow star. Moments later, the flag was raised in front of the palace, fluttering arrogantly in the wind. The Bảo An guard at the gate was immediately replaced: one demonstrator took the rifle from him and stood guard in his place.” ¹⁴

Khâm Sai Phan Kế Toại had sympathies with the Việt Minh, especially after his son, Phan Kế An, joined them. On the evening of August 17, once his resignation was accepted, he left the Khâm Sai Palace for his private home. Before leaving, he instructed the commander of the Bảo An guards and another trusted guard: “Do not fire” in order to avoid needless bloodshed.

Afterwards, the demonstration marched in turn to the City Hall, the power plant, the post office, and other offices, including the radio station. Finally, they went to the Bảo An barracks… The takeover unfolded smoothly. Communist Party members appeared in great numbers, waving their arms and shouting: “Revolution successful! Revolution successful!” ¹⁵.

In truth, had the Communists accepted Emperor Bảo Đại’s invitation (through Imperial Edict no. 105 of August 17, 1945) to come to Huế to form a government within the constitutional monarchy framework, they would have the control of all these palaces and institutions anyway, since the emperor’s role in a constitutional monarchy was only symbolic. But what they wanted was to gain prestige by “seizing power” forcefully, so that later they could launch further “earth-shaking” actions.

In his memoir Một Cơn Gió Bụi, the scholar Trần Trọng Kim wrote:

“At that time the Japanese came and told me: ‘The Japanese army is still responsible for maintaining order until the Allies arrive. If the Vietnamese government openly requests Japanese help, the Japanese can still maintain order.’ I thought: the Japanese have already surrendered, the Allies are about to arrive, so why should we ask the Japanese to suppress our own people? That would be disgraceful—‘bringing snakes in to harm your own chickens.’ I refused” ¹⁶.

Nearly 70 years later, the writer Trần Đĩnh, who grew up under the Hanoi government, also recorded:

“The Japanese Commander-in-Chief went to Huế, met Bảo Đại and Trần Trọng Kim, and said: ‘If you wish, Japan, with 50,000 elite troops, can crush the Việt Minh in one night. The Việt Minh have at most 5,000 people, and even fewer weapons.’ But both men declined” ¹⁷.

After the Việt Minh seized power in Hanoi on August 19, 1945, Emperor Bảo Đại abdicated, handing the imperial sword and seal—the symbols of royal authority—to their representatives (Trần Huy Liệu, Nguyễn Lương Bằng, Cù Huy Cận) on August 25, 1945. A week later, on September 2, 1945, Hồ Chí Minh read the Declaration of Independence.

But the joy was short-lived. Barely ten days later, on September 13, 1945, in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement, British Major General Douglas Gracey brought troops into Saigon to disarm the Japanese south of the 16th parallel.

The political situation in southern Vietnam in 1945–1946 was unstable. Many patriotic intellectuals and religious organizations did not accept the Communist leaders’ manipulations and control. The Communists responded with terror, assassinating and executing many prominent southern figures. This caused many religious groups and intellectuals (such as the prominent educator Trần Văn Hương) to withdraw from the Communist-led resistance, out of both fear and resentment.

The insecurity around Saigon–Chợ Lớn led General Gracey to impose martial law and to  arm certain French civilians, giving the French an advantage. When General Leclerc arrived in October 1945 with French forces, he expanded French control to most towns and provincial capitals in the South, driving the Việt Minh into retreat, hiding in remote forests and swamps.

One reliable source that gives us a broad picture of conditions in the South during those years is Dr. Trần Nguơn Phiêu’s Gió Mùa Đông Bắc. Born in 1927, at the age of 18 in 1945, he actively engaged in the struggle for independence during those early years ¹⁸.

Having the South stabilized, General Leclerc moved his troops north, preparing to land at Hải Phòng. On March 6, 1946, French representative Jean Sainteny signed with Hồ Chí Minh a Preliminary Agreement in which France recognized Vietnam as a “free state” within the French Union and within the Indochinese Federation. In return, Hồ’s government agreed to allow 15,000 French troops into the North for five years.

Vietnam–France tensions then escalated. On the night of December 19, 1946, the Việt Minh attacked French forces in Hanoi, opening the war that would last until the Geneva Agreement of July 1954.

When fighting began and the Việt Minh abandoned Hanoi and other cities for the resistance zones, only a small portion of the population could flee with them. Most city residents remained, still needing protection—among them intellectuals and the middle commercial class, who would have been killed or repressed had they go to Việt Minh areas.

The wave of decolonization in Asia led many Vietnamese intellectuals to believe that, if united behind a reputable leader capable of representing them, they could negotiate with the French for the gaining of independence step by step. In May 1947, the French High Commissioner Émile Bollaert gave a major speech in Hà Đông, proposing the concept of “independence in cooperation,” and declared himself “ready to consult all political factions in Vietnam.”

That was why former emperor Bảo Đại—who had voluntarily abdicated in 1945 with the statement “I do not want to be the ruler of a nation in bondage”—was sought out by many Vietnamese nationalist factions and politico-religious groups, urging him to serve as their representative.

Public opinion in France also condemned the war. Gradually, France and Vietnam reached the Hạ Long Agreements of 1948 and then the Élysée Accords of 1949, in which France recognized the independence of Vietnam.

1949 was also the year the Communists triumphed in mainland China. Two political lines crystallized in Vietnam: one rallying around a respected figure to negotiate independence step by step with France (the Nationalist side), the other relying on Chinese Communist aid to fight France (the Communist side).

For Vietnam, the Élysée Accords were not perfect. France recognized Vietnam as an independent nation “within the French Union” and confirmed the return of Cochinchina to Vietnam. But in foreign affairs, Vietnam was not fully free yet: it still had to “coordinate with the common policy of the French Union,” and any states with which Vietnam wished to establish diplomatic relations had to be in line with France. In other words, in 1949, when the Élysée Accords was signed, the State of Vietnam was not fully independent in foreign affairs.

When Hồ Chí Minh learned of the Élysée Accords, he was furious and angrily dismissed it as “just a scrap of paper.” But compared to the agreement he himself had signed on March 6, 1946, the Élysée Accords was a far greater step forward.

In the March 6, 1946 Agreement, France recognized Vietnam as “a free state,” “within the Indochinese Federation and the French Union.” In the Élysée Accords, France recognized Vietnam as an independent nation “within the French Union.” The French Union was a looser association of former French colonies, similar to the British Commonwealth.

In the March 6, 1946 Agreement signed with Ho Chi Minh, France made no promise to return Cochinchina, only that “the people might decide via referendum.” In the 1949 Élysée Accords, France confirmed Cochinchina’s return to Vietnam.

The 1946 Agreement was signed by Jean Sainteny, envoy of the French High Commissioner, with authorization from Admiral d’ Argenlieu, French Special Commissioner. The Élysée Accords was signed by the President of the French Republic, Vincent Auriol.

In the 1946 Agreement, Hồ Chí Minh accepted the stationing of 15,000 French troops in northern Vietnam, thus legitimizing their presence.

From then on, Vietnam had two governments: the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under Hồ Chí Minh, and the State of Vietnam under Chief of State Bảo Đại. The State of Vietnam became a refuge for nationalists and for the people unable to live under Communism. Over the following years, several groups of people abandoned the Việt Minh areas to return to the cities under the Nationalist government.

Thanks to massive Chinese Communist aids and the participation of Chinese Communist military advisors, the Vietnamese Communists defeated French forces at Điện Biên Phủ in 1954. Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel: the North under Communism, the South as a non-Communist state. Those unable to live under Communism fled southward.

During the war with France (1946–1954), Việt Minh sources admit 191,605 troops killed or missing. Western historians estimate between 175,000 and 300,000. Civilian deaths are estimated at 125,000–400,000 ¹⁹. The Việt Minh’s “scorched earth” policy left all cities devastated.

II.               “Fighting the Americans to Unify the Country”

The preceding paragraphs showed us that when World War II ended in 1945, if Hồ Chí Minh and the Communist Party had not dogmatically forced the country down the Communist path, Vietnam could have become independent—if not as early as the Philippines and India (from 1945 to 1947), then at least like Indonesia (in 1949), or at the latest like Malaya (in 1957).

There would have been no need to beg Communist China for help to fight the French, only to then fall under their control. If the northern leaders had not insisted on imposing Communist ideology, the country would not have been divided in two. There would have been no need for a catastrophic civil war to unify the nation.

On the other hand, during the Cold War (1947–1991) between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, Vietnam was not the only country to be partitioned. We also saw East and West Germany, and North and South Korea.

East and West Germany remained divided until they peacefully reunified in 1990.

Although North Korea launched an attack in 1950, igniting the Korean War (1950–53), after July 1953, they too accepted division at the 38th parallel, limiting the conflict to a “war of words.”

Vietnam was the only country that endured a catastrophic war, with casualties as follows:

In the North:

• Over 849,000 soldiers killed in action
• Over 600,000 soldiers wounded
• Over 232,000 soldiers missing
• Civilian deaths in Communist-controlled areas due to the war: between 30,000 and 182,000

In the South:

• 313,000 soldiers killed in action
• 1,170,000 soldiers wounded
• Between 195,000 and 430,000 civilians killed ²⁰.

Indeed, it was truly a case of “When one general succeeds, ten thousand bones are left to dry.”

People inside the country have remarked: “Con đường Bác đi là con đường bi đát” (The path Uncle Ho chose to take was a tragic one).

In the early 1980s, when General Võ Nguyên Giáp was reassigned to head the “Committee for Birth Control and Family Planning”—overseeing contraception and population limits—people in the North came up with a satirical couplet:

            Tướng Võ không còn Nguyên Giáp nữa

            Bác Hồ cũng chẳng Chí Minh đâu

(General Võ, no longer the Prime Armor
Uncle Hồ, no longer the Bright Mind)

The nation is now unified, but hearts and minds remain divided. Vietnam has been devastated, left backward, lagging far behind its neighbors. In the early 1960s, living standards in South Korea, Thailand, and Malaya were lower than those of South Vietnam. Today, they are far ahead. Is this really the “great achievement” for which the leaders of the Communist Party of Vietnam expect the Vietnamese people to be “grateful”?

To force the North’s population to sacrifice, the Communists exploited nationalism and used deception. They distorted reality, claiming that Southerners were oppressed by “American imperialists and their puppets,” living in utter misery with nothing to eat. Therefore, the youth of the North had to sacrifice themselves to “rescue” their southern brethren, in the spirit of the lines by the poet Bùi Minh Quốc:

“At twenty years old, when one sees the meaning of life,
However distant, one sets out on the road.”

Bùi Minh Quốc himself, together with his wife, the writer Dương Thị Xuân Quý, went to the southern battlefield, entrusting their only child, Bùi Dương Hương Ly, to the grandmother’s care. Writer Xuân Quý died in the South at the age of only 28, when their child was just two years old.

On April 30, 1975, following the victorious troops into Saigon, the writer Dương Thu Hương sat down on the sidewalk, covering her face and weeping like at the funeral of her father, because she realized:

“The model of society in the defeated South was in fact the true model of civilization, while we, the victors, had fought for a barbaric model of society.”

She continued:

“That realization filled me with bitterness. Our entire generation had been deceived… The Vietnamese people were pushed into a meaningless war.”

(Little Saigon Radio Interview with Writer Dương Thu Hương: ‘Vietnamese People, Even the Illiterate, Are Ashamed Because the Party Is Too Dark and Ignorant’ – Việt Báo Foundation, a Nonprofit 501(c)(3) Organization).

From an economic perspective, even in wartime conditions, the standard of living in the South in 1975 was far higher than in the North.

The singer Ái Vân recounted her first trip from Hanoi to visit her paternal aunt’s family in Saigon:

“When coming to visit Aunt Cả, the poor student Ái Vân also brought a small gift for the family, from my food ration. My cousin-in-law, chị Nga, the eldest daughter-in-law of Aunt Cả, asked: ‘What did you bring us as a gift?’ I solemnly opened the package and said: ‘I brought two kilos of rice for the family, since I thought you might be in need.’ Oh dear, the whole house burst out laughing, chị Nga laughed so hard she nearly fell off her chair. She said: ‘Goodness me, you’ve even brought us relief rice! Poor child.’ Then she led me to a huge plastic rice bin, full to the brim with snowy white, fragrant, tender rice. Only then did I notice the television, refrigerator, washing machine, and many other unfamiliar things in the house, showing a life of great convenience—something unimaginable in any northern home at that time”  ²¹.

Not only material life, but also the cultural and social life in the South in 1975 was superior to that in the North. Ái Vân continued:

“Before, we always heard that southern compatriots were ‘oppressed by Mỹ-Ngụy,’ living in misery. I always imagined Saigonese to be destitute. But when I first entered Saigon, I was utterly astonished. Just by looking at the way people dressed, wore makeup, moved about, spoke gently; just by going to the market, where every purchase came with a ‘thank you’ and a plastic bag, one could immediately tell that we did not belong to the same level of civilization. I realized then that I had been deceived by distorted information” ²².

Following are the personal accounts and reflections of a Northern technical specialist who was sent into the South for the takeover, Trương Minh:

“As soon as the vehicle crossed into Southern territory, we squeezed each other’s hands, marveling at the new scene. The houses of the people and the urban constructions such as bridges and roads near the main highways looked far more beautiful and civilized than those in the North. We traveled, rested, and traveled again until our convoy reached the Biên Hòa industrial zone. There were so many factories there. The 18 of us looked left and right at each row of factories in the area, and although no one said anything aloud, all were in awe of Southern industry.

“… Already, while still sitting on the bus, watching the scenery along the roads and the neighborhoods leading into Saigon, I could see that it was many times more advanced than the capital Hanoi. A bright, civilized appearance radiated from the clothing, lifestyle, and manners of the Southern people.

“… Saigon—or to speak more broadly, the entire South—was not a backward, poor, starving society, full of exploitation as the Hanoi press and radio had for so long told (or forced upon) the Northern people… This was the model of a civilized society, and anyone who lived in this society was truly more fortunate than living in the socialist society in the North. What a pity! Such a society has just been stolen away” ²³.

According to the cultural researcher Vương Trí Nhàn:

“Not only was the economy better, but education in the South at that time was also superior. Not only were the roads better, but the personal conduct of the people there in general was more mature than that of Northerners. Their level of knowledge and respect for the law was high. People treated each other decently; the youth at that time were eager to study and knew how to study better” ²⁴.

In his essay “Mấy cảm nhận về sự khác biệt giữa giáo dục miền Nam và giáo dục miền Bắc” (Some reflections on the differences between southern and northern education), Vương Trí Nhàn further observed:

“Just as different from Southern education, Northern education was alsovery different from the rest of the world. It is enough to understand why, after being trained in the North, when we came into contact with modern society, Northern students like us were often tongue-tied, out of place, while those who had been educated in the South integrated very naturally and effectively” ²⁵.

Here is the blog link that collects some of his reflections:

“Some Reflections on the Differences between Southern and Northern Education.”

South Vietnamese society in 1975 was by no means a perfect society. The democracy being built in the South in 1975 was not yet a fully consolidated democracy. But according to the reflections of a writer (Dương Thu Hương), an artist (Ái Vân), a technical specialist (Trương Minh), and a cultural researcher (Vương Trí Nhàn)—all of whom came from the North—that society and the people living in it did not need the Communist leaders in Hanoi to send troops across the Trường Sơn mountains to “liberate” them. More than two million Vietnamese were sacrificed in a fratricidal war, both catastrophic and meaningless. Thus August 19, 1945, the day the Việt Minh seized power from the Trần Trọng Kim government in Hanoi—while Emperor Bảo Đại and elder statesmen such as Trần Trọng Kim, Hoàng Xuân Hãn … had repeatedly invited them to cooperate—should really be regarded as a day for the Vietnamese people to commemorate with joy?

Minh Phương 

Notes

1. Tường Vũ, Vietnam’s Communist Revolution (New York : Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017), p. 105.
2. Ibid., pp. 95-96.
3. Ibid., pp. 104-105.
4. Phạm Cao Dương, Bảo Đại, Trần Trọng Kim và Đế quốc Việt Nam (California : Truyền Thống Việt, 2017), pp. 288-289. See also Phạm Khắc Hòe, Từ Triều Đình Huế đến Chiến Khu Việt Bắc (Tp HCM : NXB Trẻ, 1996), pp. 76-77.
5. Phạm Cao Dương, op. cit, pp. 289-290.
6. Trần Trọng Kim, Một Cơn Gió Bụi  (Saigon: Vĩnh Sơn, 1969), pp. 86–88.
7. Trần Đĩnh, Đèn Cù, Vol. 2 (Westminster, CA : Người Việt Books, 2014), pp. 545–547.
8. Phạm Cao Dương, op. cit., pp. 307–309.
9. Marr, David G. Vietnam 1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 374.

10. Phạm Cao Dương, op. cit., pp. 309-311.

11. Đoàn Thêm, Những Ngày Chưa Quên, 1939–1954 (Sài Gòn: Nam Chi Tùng Thư. Reprinted Los Alamitos, CA: Xuân Thu, 1969), pp. 47–48.

12. Hoàng Tường, Việt Nam Đấu Tranh (Westminster, CA : Văn Khoa, 1987), p. 68.

13. Nguyễn Tường Bách, Việt Nam Một Thế Kỷ Qua: Hồi Ký, Vol. I. (Westminster, CA: Thạch Ngữ, 1998), p. 169).

14. Hoàng Tường, op. cit, p. 68-69.

15. Ibid., p. 69.

16. Trần Trọng Kim, op. cit., p. 93.

17. Trần Đĩnh, op. cit., p. 478.

18. Trần Nguơn Phiêu, Gió Mùa Đông Bắc (Amarillo, TX: Hải Mã, 2008).

19. From Wikipedia:

First Indochina War - Wikipedia

20. From Wikipedia:

Vietnam War - Wikipedia

1. Ái Vân, Để Gió Cuốn Đi: Autobiography (Saigon: Hội Nhà Văn Pub., 2016), pp. 156–157).

22. Ibid., p. 156.

23. Trương Minh, “Chuyện kể của một người chiến thắng khi vào Nam” (Story of a victor entering the South.” In Nguyễn Tường Tâm, Cuộc Chiến Việt Nam 50 Ngày Cuối Cùng (San Jose, CA : NT Tâm, 2025), pp. 509–512.

24. “Cú sốc giáo dục khi vào Nam tiếp quản” (The educational shock when entering the South for takeover). In Nguyễn Tường Tâm, op. cit., pp. 517-518.

25. Vương Trí Nhàn, “Mấy cảm nhận về sự khác biệt giữa giáo dục miền Nam và giáo dục miền Bắc” (Some reflections on the differences between southern and northern education), in Nghiên Cứu và Phát Triển (Research and Development), Nos. 7–8 (114–115), 2014, p. 267.